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D
iscussion of conflict of interest is not new to this 
journal; one variation on the theme concerned 
the appointment of a pharmaceutical industry 
executive to the governing council of the Canadian Insti-
tutes of Health Research.1,2 We now turn to a similar con-
troversy that erupted recently with respect to the Inter-
national  Development  Research  Centre  (IDRC)  when 
it came to public attention that the chair of their board 
of governors had an affiliation with the tobacco indus-
try. IDRC, a Crown agency, funds tobacco control pro-
grams among many other initiatives. Their board chair, 
former Cabinet minister Barbara McDougall, had been 
on the board of directors of Imperial Tobacco Canada 
since March 2004 and had chaired its corporate social 
responsibility committee. This was not declared in the 
IDRC’s  announcement  of  McDougall’s  appointment  to 
their board in January 2007, or when she became board 
chair in December of that year.
The inappropriateness of serving on these two boards 
simultaneously is self-evident. But what can get lost in 
the  furore  of  conflict-of-interest  allegations  is  an  in-
formed understanding of the collateral damage caused 
by such conflicts. What has also been missed to some 
extent is an understanding of how this particular case 
exemplifies the insidious challenges faced these days by 
the tobacco control community.
First, to review the situation briefly. The IDRC “works in 
close collaboration with researchers from the developing 
world in their search for the means to build healthier, 
more equitable, and more prosperous societies.”3 This 
mandate  comfortably  accommodates  the  IDRC’s  Re-
search  for  International  Tobacco  Control  (RITC)  pro-
gram,  which  provides  grants  for  multidisciplinary 
research  on  tobacco  control  in  developing  countries. 
RITC has received funding from the UK Department for 
International Development, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, Health Canada, the Swedish International 
Development  Agency  and  the  Canadian  International 
Development Agency.4 However, in April, having become 
aware of McDougall’s tobacco industry ties, the Gates 
Foundation terminated a $5.2 million grant directed to a 
RITC initiative in Africa: “We are deeply disappointed by 
this revelation and feel this conflict is unacceptable as we 
work to support meaningful tobacco control programs in 
Africa. Therefore, we are terminating our tobacco con-
trol grant to IDRC, effective immediately.”5
As much as they are pained by the situation, the Afri-
can Tobacco Control Alliance (ATCA), whose members 
were the beneficiaries of this funding stream, have con-
gratulated the Gates Foundation on its stance. In a news 
release the ATCA stated: “The foundation’s decision is an 
important signal to philanthropies and governments that 
they must be ever vigilant in protecting their policies and 
programmes from interference by the tobacco industry.”6 
In fact, it was ATCA’s own action that precipitated the 
funding termination. Upon learning of McDougall’s dir-
ectorship  with  Imperial  Tobacco,  ATCA,  a  network  of 
127 non-governmental organizations, announced that it 
was pulling out of a planned pan-African tobacco control 
meeting in Dakar, Senegal, which it was to co-host with 
the IDRC, supported by Gates Foundation funding. As 
for ATCA’s awareness of the situation, this was triggered 
by a posting by tobacco control activist Phillipe Boucher, 
who on March 7 reported McDougall’s tobacco indus-
try ties on his blog, “Tobacco Control in Africa” (http://
blogsofbainbridge.typepad.com/africa/); he had noticed 
that this appointment was listed on the website of Aird & 
Berlis LLD, where McDougall is an adviser. (Her former 
Imperial Tobacco role is no longer listed there.)
We leave aside the question of how the fact of Mc-
Dougall’s directorship with Imperial Tobacco should be 
stumbled upon by an attentive blogger while escaping 
either the notice or the concern—we don’t know which—
of  those  responsible  for  her  governor-in-council  ap-
pointment to the IDRC. In response to the controversy, 
the  IDRC  has  maintained  that  no  decisions  affecting 
tobacco control initiatives came under McDougall’s pur-
view and that the agency’s decisions in tobacco control 
funding have not been compromised. The board is not 
responsible, they say, for the selection, approval or man-
agement of projects. This is hard to reconcile with the 
description of the role of the board that appears on the 
IDRC’s website:The  Board  of  Governors  sits  at  the  apex  of  the  Centre’s 
corporate  structure.  It  provides  strategic  leadership, 
sanctions  the  general  orientation  of  the  Centre,  and 
approves  financial,  administrative,  and  human  resource 
policies. It must also approve the Centre’s annual program 
of  work  and  budget  and  establish  accountability  for 
current  activities.  To  fulfil  this  responsibility,  the  Board 
receives  regular  reports  from  IDRC  management.  These 
reports enable the Board to monitor program activities and 
measure results against the strategic objectives set out in 
the Corporate Strategy and Program Framework (CSPF) for 
2000–2005.7
At least the IDRC will now require from its board of 
governors “an annual declaration on their outside activ-
ities to identify any areas of apparent, potential, or real 
conflict of interest.”8 A hard lesson learned.
McDougall’s role with Imperial Tobacco affected the 
ability of the IDRC to do its work. Their RITC program 
lost important funding, and although the IDRC proposes 
to make up the shortfall from its own resources,8 it is un-
clear whether the recipient NGOs will feel able to accept 
it. What is at stake here is compliance with the Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control—an international 
treaty, initiated by the WHO, which Canada signed in 
2003. According to article 5.3 of the Framework Con-
vention, all publicly funded organizations must be free 
of industry influence:
In  setting  and  implementing  their  public  health  policies 
with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect 
these policies from commercial and other vested interests 
of  the  tobacco  industry  in  accordance  with  national  law.9
An interpretation document for these three succinct 
lines  was  not  adopted  until  November  2008,10  which 
opens the door for the argument that the inappropriate-
ness of McDougall’s membership of the IDRC board was 
not crystal clear at the time of her appointment. More-
over, her position on the Imperial Tobacco board ended 
in  March  2010;  thus,  the  IDRC  is  now  in  compliance 
with the Framework Convention. By this logic, there is 
no need for McDougall to step down from or be removed 
from the IDRC—however offensive the optics may be to 
Canada’s African colleagues in tobacco control.
No matter, it seems, that the cross-appointment put 
recipients of RITC funding grants in an untenable pos-
ition. No matter that it has tarnished Canada’s exemplary 
record  as  an  international  leader  in  tobacco  control. 
No matter the shadow it has cast on the credibility of a 
worthy agency of the Crown. 
But something even more damaging underlies all of 
this.  Among  its  recommendations  for  “addressing  to-
bacco  industry  interference  in  public  health  policies” 
the interpretation document for article 5.3 specifies the 
following:
Denormalize and, to the extent possible, regulate activities 
described as “socially responsible” by the tobacco industry, 
including but not limited to activities described as “corporate 
social responsibility.”9
To explain why this is important, the interpretation 
document observes:
The tobacco industry conducts activities described as socially 
responsible to distance its image from the lethal nature of the 
product it produces and sells or to interfere with the setting 
and  implementation  of  public  health  policies.  Activities 
that are described as “socially responsible” by the tobacco 
industry, aiming at the promotion of tobacco consumption, 
is a marketing as well as a public relations strategy that falls 
within the Convention’s definition of advertising, promotion 
and sponsorship.10
Denormalization—that is, efforts to reduce the social 
acceptability of smoking and the activities of the tobacco 
industry—has long been a pillar of tobacco control. Let’s 
talk, a “report”11 produced by the Imperial Tobacco’s cor-
porate social responsibility committee when McDougall 
was its chair, is a wonderfully transparent example of 
the tobacco industry’s attempts to make its business ac-
ceptable to regulators and the public. This task certainly 
was easier in the bad old days, when cigarette ads were 
everywhere, including in medical journals. Relentless ef-
forts by tobacco control advocates in Canada resulted in 
the passage—and survival in the face of a Supreme Court 
challenge—of one of the toughest pieces of tobacco con-
trol legislation in the world (Tobacco Act S.C. 1997 c. 13). 
This legislation has Canadian tobacco firms backed into 
such a tight corner that they cannot display their wares 
in stores (the curiously named “power walls” of cigarette 
displays must now be covered) or even on their own web-
sites. Imperial Tobacco, like its competitors, attempts to 
maintain that they are not trying to attract new smok-
ers but are merely competing for market share among 
people who “choose” to keep smoking—whatever kind of 
choice people make in the grip of powerfully addictive 
substance. It’s not that the irony is lost on the industry: 
“The  principle  of  Responsible  Product  Stewardship  is 
the basis on which we meet consumer demand for a legal 
product that is a cause of serious diseases.”11
The existence of corporate social responsibility com-
mittees within any tobacco company would be risible if 
the damage they are capable of causing were not so ser-
ious. They are a ploy to appropriate and thus disarm the 
arguments of tobacco control activists: “We have said it 
before and we will say it again: there is no such thing 
as a safe cigarette and the most effective way to reduce 
the risks associated with smoking is to quit. But there 
are 5.4 million adult smokers 19 years and older in Can-
ada who choose not to quit.”11 By way of being “respon-
sible” toward those who make this “choice,” the industry 
deflects attention from the harms of tobacco use with 
doublespeak about corporate citizenship (including the 
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(a.k.a. new product introductions), and with attempts to 
manoeuvre regulators into playing along: “We aspire to 
develop tobacco products with critical mass appeal that 
will, over time, be recognized by scientific and regula-
tory authorities as posing substantially reduced risks to 
health.”11 
Imperial  Tobacco’s  glossy  corporate  social  respon-
sibility report contains a photograph of McDougall with 
a quotation: “Imperial Tobacco Canada is one of the few 
Canadian companies to have engaged in open dialogue 
with its stakeholders. I’m proud to be involved in the 
groundbreaking Let’s talk initiative.”11 Who can believe 
that such “talk” is anything but an end-run around legal 
constraints  against  advertising  and  marketing  activ-
ities? Tobacco companies are allowed to talk about the 
nice things they do for society; for instance, Imperial To-
bacco notes, for 2006, its $4.8 million in cultural and 
social donations, the tax revenue they generated for the 
government ($3.9 billion), and their contribution to the 
economy ($243.4 million in purchases from suppliers),11 
even if they can’t hold up a picture of a package of ciga-
rettes. It’s tough for them: “Canada’s laws governing the 
marketing of tobacco products are among the strictest 
in the world. As a result, our ability to communicate in-
formation to adult consumers about a new generation of 
potentially reduced risk tobacco products is very lim-
ited.”11 Nevertheless, the corporate social responsibility 
report manages to picture snus, explaining reassuringly 
that it is a form of “pasteurized oral tobacco that is sold 
in small porous pouches” and that “[w]ithin the next 12 
months, we will initiate market tests in one or more Can-
adian regions for a Swedish-style snus product.”11 
It is a policy paradox12 that the success of Canadian 
tobacco control legislation in restricting the marketing 
activities of the tobacco industry provides an incentive 
for the expansion of tobacco sales elsewhere. The par-
ent company of Imperial Tobacco Canada, British Amer-
ican Tobacco, which sells into 180 countries, posted for 
its African and Middle Eastern regions in 2009 an 11% 
increase in sales volume, a 31% increase in revenue and a 
41% increase in adjusted profits. The corresponding fig-
ures for the Americas were –6%, 10% and 13%.13
The tobacco industry will continue to use any means 
available to develop its market in countries whose popu-
lations are gaining more disposable income, where young 
people will readily become acculturated to a smoking so-
ciety, and where the implementation and enforcement of 
tobacco control policies are difficult. In the meantime, 
in countries such as Canada where legislation and regu-
lation are relatively effective, one strategy is to co-opt 
people of influence into the industry’s cynical corporate 
social responsibility game. The Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control is wise to these manoeuvres. Bar-
bara McDougall’s resignation from the board of govern-
ors of the IDRC would be respectful of the intention of 
the convention and of Canada’s obligation to comply with 
it. Moreover, it would help those in the front lines of to-
bacco control research and programming to get on with 
work that—unlike corporate social responsibility baffle-
gab—really can make a difference. Ms. McDougall’s re-
cent involvement with the tobacco industry has damaged 
the reputation of the IDRC; we therefore urge her to re-
sign from its board of governors.
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